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Types of Experiments and Causal Process Tracing: 
What Happened on the Kaibab Plateau in the 1920s 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In a well-cited book chapter, ecologist Jared Diamond characterizes three main types of 
experiment performed in community ecology: laboratory experiment, field experiment, and 
natural experiment. Diamond argues that each form of experiment has strengths and weaknesses, 
with respect to, for example, realism or the ability to follow a causal trajectory. But does 
Diamond’s typology exhaust the available kinds of cause-finding practices? Some social 
scientists have characterized something they call “causal process tracing.” Is this a fourth type of 
experiment or something else? I examine Diamond’s typology and causal process tracing in the 
context of a case study concerning the dynamics of wolf and deer populations on the Kaibab 
Plateau in the 1920s, a case that has been used as a canonical example of a trophic cascade by 
ecologists but which has also been subject to controversy. I argue that ecologists have profitably 
deployed causal process tracing together with other types of experiment to help settle questions 
of causality in this case. It remains to be seen how widespread the use of causal process tracing 
outside of the social sciences is (or could be), but there are some potentially promising 
applications, particularly with respect to questions about specific causal sequences.  
 
Keywords: experiment; causal process tracing; causation; methodology; trophic cascade; 
ecology. 	  
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1. Introduction 
 
In a classic chapter of a multi-authored edited volume, ecologist Jared Diamond (1986) 
distinguishes between three types of experiments: 1) lab experiments, 2) field experiments, and 
3) natural experiments.  Natural experiments are of particular interest for answering questions for 
which lab experiments and field experiments are not possible or practical; for example, many 
questions in social science or ecology/evolution are of this sort.  But natural experiments 
typically lack some of the features that provide confidence in causal inferences, such as the 
ability the regulate variables other than the putative cause.  Thad Dunning (2008) suggests that 
causal process tracing, a (typically) qualitative method commonly used in the social sciences, is 
one way of strengthening causal inferences from natural experiments.   
 
Dunning’s intriguing suggestion opens up further questions: how does causal process tracing 
relate to Diamond’s typology of different types of experiment – is it a fourth type of experiment 
or something else?  What can it reveal that cannot be revealed by the different experiment types?  
Is it relevant outside of social science? 
 
To explore answers to these questions, I’ll discuss a canonical case in ecology: the dynamics 
between wolf and deer populations on the Kaibab Plateau in Arizona in the 1920s.  For a time, 
this case was cited in numerous ecology textbooks as an exemplar of the dangers of predator 
removal and of a trophic cascade (Young 2002).  Trophic cascades have been defined as a 
situation where “the presence of top trophic-level predators significantly affects herbivores (the 
next lower trophic level), and this interaction alters or influences vegetation (e.g., species 
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composition, age structure, or spatial distribution)” (Ripple and Beschta 2005).  In the case of the 
Kaibab, it was claimed that the extirpation of wolves caused deer populations to explode, which 
led to a reduction in food for the deer, ultimately resulting in their starvation.  Much of the 
evidence for the Kaibab trophic cascade was based on the work of ecologist Aldo Leopold 
(1943) – known to many philosophers for his Land Ethic – but this was challenged by Graeme 
Caughley (1970).  Thirty-six years later, Dan Binkley et al. (2006) tried to debunk Caughley’s  
debunking and to vindicate Leopold’s original conclusions with a thorough re-analysis of the 
evidence.  I argue that Binkley and colleagues deployed natural experiments together with causal 
process tracing in order to make their case.  I conclude that there is, in fact, good evidence for a 
causal connection between the changes in the wolf and deer populations on the Kaibab that 
occurred in the 1920s, restoring the canonical case to its rightful place in ecology.  I further 
conclude that using causal process tracing in combination with other experiment types can 
indeed strengthen causal inferences, especially for particular historical episodes but also for 
general causation as well. 
 
I proceed as follows.  I begin by characterizing Diamond’s typology of experiments, followed by 
a characterization of causal process tracing.  I then turn to the case of the Kaibab, first providing 
necessary background information over the controversy between Leopold and Caughley that 
Binkley and colleagues were responding to and then examining Binkley et al.’s re-analysis of the 
case of the Kaibab in light of Diamond’s typology of experiments and causal process tracing.  I 
then give discussion of some of the philosophical implications of my analysis and conclude. 
 
2. Diamond’s typology of experiments 
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Jared Diamond (1986) describes his typology of three main types of experiment in the context of 
community ecology.  I will follow Diamond in this characterization, although it should be 
evident that the three types can be used in disciplines outside of ecology.1  The basic distinction 
between the three main types is: 
 
1. Laboratory Experiment - perturbations are produced by the experimenter in the 
laboratory. 
 
2. Field Experiment - perturbations are produced by the experimenter in the field. 
 
3. Natural Experiment - natural perturbations occur in the field; they are not produced by 
the experimenter.  This includes perturbations due to “humans other than ecologists.” 
 
According to Diamond, in practice, laboratory experiments, field experiments, and natural 
experiments form a continuum (as we shall see).   
 
                                               
1 The sometimes-controversial Jared Diamond might seem like an odd starting point for my analysis, but my reasons 
for using his typology are fourfold.  First, it should be noted that the chapter in which Diamond’s analysis appears 
has been unusually influential for this sort of (frankly, philosophical) piece; as of 22 November 2018, Google 
Scholar showed 599 citations to the chapter. Second, Diamond is particularly focused on community ecology and so 
it is appropriate for the questions concerning the Kaibab, which are likewise part of community ecology.  Third, as I 
argue subsequently, I think the tradeoffs that Diamond identifies are exemplified in the analysis of the Kaibab. 
Fourth, the connection between Diamond’s typology and causal process tracing is made in a book co-authored by 
Diamond (with James Robinson), Natural Experiments in History. Of course, none of this is to say that Diamond 
has the final or most complete word on various types of experiments and their tradeoffs, and many philosophers 
have contributed to a rich literature on these topics.  See, e.g., Brandon (1994), Woodward (2003), Odenbaugh 
(2004), Morgan (2013), Currie and Levi (forthcoming).  A more extensive analysis than this Discussion seeks to 
provide might profitably engage connections between causal process tracing and this literature.  Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point. 
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With laboratory experiments, the experimenter regulates the abiotic environment (light, 
temperature, water, etc.) and the biotic environment, often with communities of two or a very 
few species.  Common examples in community ecology include organisms kept in bottles 
(“bottle experiments”) or plants kept in greenhouses.  Some communities are randomly assigned 
to receive the treatment (the perturbation, or possible cause under test) whereas other 
communities do not (the control). The control of the environment is the primary feature of a lab 
experiment and the one that gives confidence in causal inferences that can be made from the 
experiment. 
 
With field experiments, the experimenter selects outdoor sites so as to initially have the same 
values of unregulated variables to the extent possible.  The sites are generally adjacent to one 
another, both for the sake of convenience and to help ensure similarity of sites (this aspect of 
field experiments will be important later). However, there is no further regulation of the 
environment beyond seeking similar sites.  Some communities are randomly assigned to receive 
the treatment (e.g., removal or introduction of a species) whereas other communities do not (the 
control).   
 
Diamond characterizes two types of natural experiments: natural trajectory experiments and 
natural snapshot experiments.  With natural trajectory experiments, comparisons of the same 
community at various times before, during, and after a witnessed field perturbation are 
performed.  The environment is not regulated.  Before the perturbation, the site serves as the 
control; after the perturbation, it can be considered to have received the “treatment.”  So, the 
“sites” (really, one and the same site through time) are matched except to the extent they might 
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otherwise change over time .  With natural snapshot experiments, comparisons of different 
communities assumed to have reached a quasi-steady state with respect to the perturbing variable 
are performed. Again, the environment not regulated.  Sites are matched to the extent possible; 
however, sites are often distant in space.  Sites having experienced a certain perturbation are 
considered to have received the treatment; sites that have not are considered the control.   
 
With both types of natural experiment, it seems clear that Diamond is emphasizing an analogy to 
laboratory experiments and field experiments.  By showing how they can likewise be 
characterized in terms of control groups and treatment groups, he shows how causal inferences 
can be drawn from natural experiments. 
 
According to Diamond, the three types of experiment differ in their merits; there are tradeoffs.2  
laboratory experiments have the highest degree of regulation of independent variables and site 
matching, both of which give confidence one’s causal inferences, and natural experiments have 
the least (and so, yield the weakest causal inference), with field experiments falling in between.  
For practical reasons, natural experiments tend to have the greatest spatial and temporal scale 
and laboratory experiments the least, with field experiments again falling in between.  For both 
practical and ethical reasons, natural experiments tend to have the greatest range of species and 
perturbations that can be studied and laboratory experiments the least, with field experiments 
once again falling in between.  With respect to realism, natural experiments are superior to field 
experiments which are superior to laboratory experiments.3  Finally, with respect to the ability to 
                                               
2 See Inkpen (manuscript) for a defense of this claim. 
3 Relatedly, see Cartwright (2007) and Cartwright and Munro (2010) on the limitations of randomized controlled 
trials. 
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follow a causal trajectory, one can do so with laboratory experiments, field experiments, and 
natural trajectory experiments, but not with natural snapshot experiments. 
 
Now let’s turn to causal process tracing to see how it fits in with Diamond’s typology.4 
 
3. Causal process tracing 
 
Causal process tracing (CPT) is a bit difficult to pin down; however, David Collier’s definition 
provides a good starting point: 
 
Process tracing... is an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from 
diagnostic pieces of evidence— often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events 
or phenomena (Collier 2011, 824; emphasis added). 
 
As a tool of causal inference, process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events or 
situations over time. Yet grasping this unfolding is impossible if one cannot adequately 
describe an event or situation at one point in time... To characterize a process, we must be 
able to characterize key steps in the process, which in turn permits good analysis of 
change and sequence (Collier 2011, 824; emphasis in original). 
 
As the highlighted portions indicate, identifying a series of key events or phenomena through 
time – resurrecting a timeline – is a fundamental part of CPT.  It is also typical that the 
                                               
4 See Crasnow (2012, 2017) and Morgan (2012) for other philosophical examinations of causal process tracing. 
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diagnostic pieces of evidence used are quite diverse, including both quantitative and qualitative 
data.  Interviews, written records, etc., are all legitimate forms of data that can be used in CPT.  
Again, the CPT approach has its origins in the social sciences. 
 
Henry Brady’s (2010) discussion of a CPT of the 2000 U.S. presidential election (George W. 
Bush vs. Al Gore) provides an illustrative example.  After the election, the question arose as to 
whether thousands of votes – perhaps as many as 10,000 or more – were lost for Bush because 
networks declared Gore the winner of Florida before the polls had closed in western Florida, 
which is in a different timezone than eastern Florida.  To determine the answer to that question, 
researchers consulted the TV networks to find out when they made their announcements relative 
to when polls closed in western Florida (10 minutes before).  They considered two possibilities, 
one that the rate of voting in the last 10 minutes was the same as it was throughout the day and 
the same as it was in the last hour, using data from previous elections as an estimate.  Interviews 
with Florida election officials and review of media reports indicated that there is typically no last 
minute rush to the polls in western Florida.  So, assuming those rates are more or less correct, 
about 4200 voters could have been affected by the early calling of the election.  But what 
percentage of those voters heard the announcement?  Research on media exposure suggests that 
20% (840 people) would be very high.  But, of course, not all potential voters would be Bush 
voters; about 2/3 of western Florida voted for Bush (so, about 560 votes).  However, a review of 
past work on the impact of early calls show that they do not deter all voters from voting, e.g., 
because there are other races at stake.  Thus, CPT concluded that the claim for thousands of 
missing votes lost was not supported. 
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This case illustrates CPT in its use of diverse sources of data, including written records and 
interviews, to piece together a timeline: 10 minutes before polls closed in western Florida, media 
outlets called the race for Gore, an announcement that was heard probably heard by at most 20% 
of voters, 1/3 of whom were probably not going to vote for Bush anyway and some of who 
would still have gone to the polls regardless.  Thus at most 560 voters stayed home rather than 
voting, and probably less.   I note also that in this CPT, past data is used to infer tendencies, such 
as voter habits, and these are key parts of the analysis. 
 
What is harder to glean from this case is a characterization of a specific CPT method. The use of 
diverse types of data is part of the problem; it’s not as though we can specify the statistical 
methods or inference procedure, as can be done with the types of experiment.  Even the “setup” 
cannot be given a general characterization the way that one can do with each of the experiment 
types, which were done in terms of treatment groups and control groups with varying amounts of 
regulation and other aspects.  And how the “piecing together” of the different pieces of data 
occurs is unspecified – and probably has to remain so.  It is “detective work.”  Indeed, examples 
of CPT in the literature are very disparate: from the analysis of election results just described, to 
Semmelweis’s well-studied discovery of the cause of puerperal fever, to John Snow’s study of 
the causes of a cholera epidemic, to Sherlock Holmes’s detective work.  
 
Having said this, researchers have endeavored to characterize CPT methods (see, e.g., Beach and 
Pedersen 2013).  It would require considerable discussion to present and evaluate this work; my 
contention here is simply that, by its very nature, much will have to remain unspecified and case-
dependent, as even those who seek to describe its methodology seem to admit: 
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What empirical material can be evidence of is often case-specific in process-tracing 
research. The basic point is that the workings of mechanisms often leave different 
empirical observables in different cases, despite being the same theorized mechanism. 
Given the very case-specific nature of the evidence implied by the mechanism in 
different cases, what empirical material counts as evidence in one case is not necessarily 
what counts as evidence in another. To develop empirical fingerprints that are sensitive to 
the particulars of individual cases, however, requires considerable case-specific 
knowledge and expertise (Beach 2017). 
 
In saying that there is no one univocal CPT method, my intention is not to be critical, but rather, 
simply descriptive.  There is good reason to think that CPT has been extremely fruitful in spite of 
(or perhaps because of) being somewhat open-ended; the case developed in this paper is meant to 
be one such example, but there are many others in the literature.  In any case, not much hangs on 
my contention that there is no one CPT method. 
 
I suggest instead that rather than thinking of CPT as a method alongside the experimental 
methods, perhaps the general class that includes laboratory experiments, field experiments, 
natural experiments, and CPTs can be considered cause-finding practices.  If my suggestion here 
is correct, some questions still remain:  What can these different ways of finding causes tell us? 
Are CPTs useful (and used) outside of the social sciences? 
 
Let’s turn to the case of the Kaibab for partial answers. 
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4. The Canonical Case of the Kaibab 
 
In part inspired by his study of the Kaibab Plateau in Arizona in the 1920s, Aldo Leopold wrote: 
 
I have lived to see state after state extirpate its wolves. I have watched the face of many a 
newly wolfless mountain, and seen the south-facing slopes wrinkle with a maze of new 
deer trails. I have seen every edible bush and seedling browsed, first to anaemic 
desuetude, and then to death. I have seen every edible tree defoliated to the height of a 
saddlehorn. Such a mountain looks as if someone had given God a new pruning shears, 
and forbidden Him all other exercise. In the end the starved bones of the hoped-for deer 
herd, dead of its own too-much, bleach with the bones of the dead sage, or molder under 
the high-lined junipers (Leopold 1949, 130-2). 
 
That quote is taken from his classic essay “Thinking Like a Mountain” in A Sand County 
Almanac, aimed at a general audience.  Less poetically, and for a scientific audience, Leopold 
wrote: 
 
We have found no record of a deer irruption in North America antedating the removal of 
deer predators.  Those parts of the continent which still retain the native predators have 
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reported no irruptions.  This circumstantial evidence supports the surmise that removal of 
predators predisposes a deer herd to irruptive behavior (Leopold 1943, 360).5 
 
As mentioned above, the wolves and deer of the Kaibab would come to be seen as the exemplar 
of the dangers of predator removal and the exemplar of a trophic cascade, and the example was 
included in many ecology textbooks (Young 2002).   Again, the rough idea of a trophic cascade 
is that a loss of predators leads to an increase in herbivores which leads to a change in vegetation 
(which can subsequently affect herbivores).  Leopold described a formerly stable Kaibab deer 
herd of around 4000 deer that began to increase around 1910, with the range showing 
overbrowsing.  According to Leopold, by 1924 the deer herd had increased to 100,000, followed 
by a famine that reduced the herd 60 percent over two winters.  By 1939, Leopold estimated that 
the herd was down to about 10,000, with a lowered carrying capacity.  Leopold cites the loss of 
predators (cougars and wolves) along with fire control as events that pave the way for deer 
irruptions,  comparing the Kaibab to similar locations across the U.S. 
 
But the canonical case of the Kaibab was debunked by Graeme Caughley. Caughley’s discussion 
of Leopold is remarkably brief; it is just one section of a much longer paper.Caughley begins by 
challenging the data that Leopold based his conclusions on, arguing that the records are 
inconsistent and that some of Leopold’s assumptions are arbitrary (the details of his objections 
need not concern us here, although it’s worth noting, as I mention below, that Binkley and 
                                               
5 This quotation and the previous quotation both hint that Leopold saw a number of instances where he thought that 
wolves and other predators had played a role in the population irruptions of deer and other prey animals.  
Nevertheless, the focus in this essay will be on the case of the Kaibab, a particular focus of Leopold’s as well, 
although I turn briefly to the question of the more general phenomenon in section 6. 
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colleagues found evidence to support Leopold’s data).  Concerning these data, Caughley 
concludes: 
 
Little can be gleaned from the original records beyond the suggestion that the population 
began a decline sometime in the period 1924-1930, and that this decline was probably 
preceded by a period of increase. Any further conclusion is speculative (Caughley 1970, 
56). 
 
After calling into question Leopold’s data, Caughley challenges Leopold’s explanation of the 
only point of agreement about the data, that there was an increase and subsequent decline in the 
number of deer on the Kaibab: 
 
The cause of the eruption is more doubtful than the literature suggests. Increase in deer 
numbers was certainly concomitant with reduction of pumas and coyotes but it also 
coincided with a reduction of sheep and cattle. A reported total of 200,000 sheep grazing 
on the plateau in 1889 had by 1908 decreased to a total of 5,000.  Lauckhart and Howard  
considered that the increase of deer was a consequence of habitat being altered by fire 
and grazing, and that the reduction of predators was of minor influence (Caughley 1970, 
56; citations removed). 
 
In short, Caughley acknowledges that an increase in deer numbers did coincide with the removal 
of predators, but states that it also coincided with a reduction in sheep and cattle (who would no 
longer be competing with the deer for food, allowing deer populations to increase), essentially 
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offering a possible alternative causal explanation for the increase in deer population size. Citing 
authors who held that the reduction of predators was “of minor influence,” fire is added as an 
additional potential causal factor to grazing. This is the full extent of Caughley’s critique of 
Leopold.  Nonetheless, Caughley’s brief debunking was seen as sufficiently decisive that the 
case of the Kaibab was removed from many ecology textbooks (Young 2002). 
 
Thirty-six years later, Dan Binkley and colleagues sought to debunk the debunker: 
 
We conclude that Caughley’s (1970) hypothesis about the reduction of livestock/deer 
competition as a driver of the irruption is refuted...The evidence for deer irruptions 
following periods of reduced predation was consistent for both the 1920s and the 1940s, 
supporting the idea that predation limits the density of low deer populations, and food 
limits deer populations (and the absence of aspen recruitment) at high populations 
(Binkley et al 2006, 240). 
 
In responding to Caughley (1970), Binkley et al. (2006) focused primarily (but not exclusively) 
on the herbivore/vegetation part of the trophic cascade, i.e., the claim that an increase in 
herbivores leads to a change in vegetation. More specifically, they examined the question of 
whether a loss of wolves and cougars led to increase in deer which led to a decrease in aspen 
(deer eat young aspen shoots, preventing aspen regeneration). 
 
5. Binkley et al. (2006) “Was Aldo Leopold Right about the Kaibab Deer Herd?” 
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The investigation performed by Binkley and colleagues is instructive for the issues that have 
been raised in this paper because, as I will show in this section, their study can be seen as 
consisting of three parts: 
 
1.  a natural trajectory experiment  
2.  two natural snapshot experiments  
3.  causal process tracing (CPT) 
 
To be clear, this is my analysis of their study, not the terms that the scientists use themselves.  
Nonetheless, I will show that the fit is quite close, allowing us to see the distinctive roles that can 
be played by natural experiments and CPT in the scientists’ overall causal conclusions. 
 
5.1 Part 1: Binkley et al’s Natural Trajectory Experiment 
 
In one study, Binkley et al. (2006) examined the numbers of quaking aspen of different ages, via 
a study of the aspens currently present across the entire Kaibab Plateau, using tree diameter as a 
proxy for age. Recall that for an natural trajectory experiment, one performs comparisons of the 
same community at various times before, during, and after a witnessed field perturbation.  So, 
although Binkley and colleagues don’t literally observe the trees before and after perturbation, 
tree diameter allows them to do that by proxy, allowing a study of the aspen population through 
time.  Thus, this study can be characterized as an natural trajectory experiment. 
 
Binkley et al. (2006) found that the age structure of aspen on the Kaibab generally followed a 
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typical pattern for all-aged forests, with number of trees decreasing exponentially with age.  But 
there were notable exceptions to this pattern: periods when there were more aspen than expected 
(1877-1886 and 1967-1992) and periods when there were fewer aspen than expected (1913-1937, 
especially between 1923-1927, the key period in question, and 1953-1962).  Importantly, the 
periods of low aspen numbers correlated with periods of purported deer irruptions – the 
perturbation – in the 1920s and 1950s.   
 
5.2 Part 2: Binkley et al.’s Natural Snapshot Experiments 
 
In a second pair of experiments, Binkley et al. (2006) examined the ages of quaking aspen 
present on the Kaibab today, comparing aspen within a fenced-in area (no deer) to aspen outside 
that area (deer) as well as comparing aspen within an area protected by dogs (no deer) to aspen 
outside that area (deer).  Recall that with an natural snapshot experiment the researcher compares 
different communities assumed to have reached a quasi-steady state with respect to the 
perturbing variable.  Thus, these studies can be understood as natural snapshot experiments with 
the deer as the relevant perturbing variable.  However, unlike most natural snapshot experiments, 
the “control” and “treatment” sites were adjacent, meaning that the study was similar to an field 
experiment in the matching of the sites. 
 
Binkley et al. found that “The only successful aspen recruitment during this period was found in 
areas protected from deer by fences or dogs (2006, 233).  Pictures of the fenced in area from 
1930, 1942, 1948, and 2003 that Binkley et al include in their paper show this result very clearly: 
there are trees within the fenced in area but not outside, except for a couple of young trees in the 
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latest photo.  Binkley et al. note that their findings are consistent with an earlier study of forty-
one fenced in plots (the one that they inspected was one of these) established in 1927 and 
examined in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
5.3 Combining the natural trajectory experiment and the natural snapshot experiments 
 
The natural trajectory experiment and the natural snapshot experiments each provide causally 
relevant evidence.  The natural trajectory experiment reveals that increased numbers of deer and 
decreased numbers of aspen are correlated through time.  The natural snapshot experiments, 
because they involve examination of adjacent sites, give near field experiment-quality evidence 
that increased numbers of deer are a causal factor for decreased aspen recruitment (again, the 
only significant aspen recruitment from the 1920s is found in places where there were no deer, 
adjacent to locations with deer but no aspen). 
 
So, by combining natural snapshot experiments with an natural trajectory experiment, Binkley et 
al. strengthen their causal inferences; there is evidence that increased deer numbers caused 
decreased aspen numbers through time.  But what about other possible causes?  That’s where the 
CPT comes in. 
 
5.4 Part 3: Binkley et al.’s Causal Process Tracing 
 
Binkley et al. (2006) sought out multiple sources of information in order to reconstruct the late 
19th-20th century timeline of the Kaibab, looking for correlations between other possible causal 
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factors and aspen recruitment.   Their sources included comparative ring-width chronologies for 
some of the older aspens and pines (to help determine the past effects of climate), interviews 
with Dennis Lund (formerly with the Kaibab National Forest) and John Goodwin (Arizona Fish 
and Game Department), published and unpublished records from the Arizona Fish and Game 
Department, published reports from USDA Forest Services, and secondary sources from peer 
reviewed journals such as Journal of Climate.  Recall that CPTs use multiple sources of 
information, including qualitative sources, to infer the temporal sequence of events or 
phenomena.  Thus, this part of their study fits the characterization of the CPT approach.6 
 
As a result of this analysis, Binkley et al. found that increased aspen numbers (which might have 
led to deer irruption) were not significantly correlated with climate, decrease in livestock (sheep 
and cattle)7 but that they were correlated with fire suppression.  They found that decreased aspen 
numbers (which might have resulted from deer irruption) were not significantly correlated with 
climate, fire, increase in livestock, logging but were correlated with increased deer numbers.  
And they found that increased deer numbers were correlated with decreased human hunting of 
deer, fire suppression, and increased human hunting of predators. 
 
On the latter correlation, essential for defending the causal role for wolves and other predators 
postulated by Leopold, they found that 5-year periods of low predation by humans were all 
                                               
6 Similarly, Ripple and Beschta “compiled historical records of wolf kill estimates, by year, from the records of the 
US Department of Agriculture and obtained information on case studies of ungulate irruptions, by year, for these 
same western states from Leopold and colleagues” in order to “compare the timing of wolf kills (and ultimate 
extirpation) with the timing of deer (Odocoileus spp.) and elk (Cervus elaphus) irruptions to evaluate any temporal 
patterns in these two variables” (Ripple and Beschta 2005, 614).  Thus, their analysis might also be reasonably 
construed as CPT.  It is a measure of the significance of this historical (canonical) case that so much attention has 
been paid to it.   
7 In these cases, Binkley et al. (2006) cited sources to correct Caughley’s (1970) numbers. 
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followed by 5-year periods of rapid increases in deer numbers. This supports the general claim 
that low rates of predation enable the deer population to irrupt.  Importantly, other periods with 
low human predation that lacked intensive predator control did not show these irruptions, 
suggesting that the (non-human) predators were controlling the populations,  Finally, they state 
that “the two major irruptions of the deer population in the 20th century followed periods of 
major reductions in predation” (Binkley et al. 2006, 239). 
 
These findings challenge Caughley’s (1970) hypothesis that removal of livestock caused the deer 
irruption and support Leopold’s hypotheses concerning the effects of increased hunting of 
predators, decreased hunting of deer, and fire suppression.   
 
5.5 Combining natural trajectory experiment, natural snapshot experiments, and CPT 
 
By adding a CPT analysis to the natural trajectory experiment and the natural snapshot 
experiments, Binkley et al mitigate the shortcomings of the natural experiments.  In natural 
experiments, independent variables cannot be regulated; Binkley et al’s CPT rules out other 
plausible causes of the low aspen numbers in the 1920s and gives some weight to predators over 
livestock as the cause of the deer irruption.  Moreover, CPT rules these out as causes not just at 
the time in question but through time (late 19th century -> 20th century).  In sum, by deploying a 
CPT approach, Binkley et al. leverage the strengths of natural experiments (realism, large 
spatial/temporal scale) with fewer weaknesses.  
 
However, it should be clear from my discussion in section 5.4 that  it does not make sense to call 
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CPT an experimental method inasmuch as one cannot identify control or treatment groups. It is 
not even clear that CPT should be considered a method at all (as I argued in section 3).  It would 
be hard to characterize a method that dictated which pieces of evidence the researchers should 
have looked at.  They considered the natural world, various written sources, interviews, etc., but 
there is no a priori guidance that one could give as to which of these sources, or even types of 
sources, they ought to have consulted.  (Moreover, I imagine that their background knowledge 
played a central role in their choices and that their initial investigations led to checking 
additional sources that they might not have originally considered).  Is “seek out all available 
sources of causal information in a given timeline that you can think of or learn about” a method?  
It is a commitment, a practice, but it seems to me too vague to be considered a method.  
Nonetheless, I believe the analysis of Binkley and colleagues shows it to be a fruitful practice, 
providing information about the presence and absence of various correlations through time that 
in turn provides (defeasible) evidence for and against various causal factors – evidence that could 
be obtained in no other way.  Thus, as I suggested earlier, we might consider CPT to be a cause-
finding practice.  Since the experimental methods described by Diamond are likewise 
commitments to seek out available causal information, albeit in more prescribed ways, we can 
see the experimental methods and CPT as all part of the larger category of “cause-finding 
practices.” 
 
The researchers, unsurprisingly, acknowledge that “uncertainty about causality remains” but also 
point out that “this level of ambiguity is common in almost all cases involving population 
ecology, land management, and people” (Binkley et al. 2006, 240).  For example, they note that 
“several of the historical reports make passing comments about the impacts of rodent grazing,” 
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(Binkley et al. 2006, 239),  which could have affected the vegetation that was available for deer.  
However, if more detailed information concerning rodent grazing is simply unavailable, then it 
will be impossible for researchers to determine whether rodent grazing was a significant causal 
factor over time.  My claim, then, is only that the researchers have provided strong evidence for 
their claims, perhaps as strong as can be expected given the nature of the study and the data that 
were available to them. 
 
Diamond claims: “Ecologists, like scientists in many other fields, can profit by applying different 
methodologies to the same system” (1986, 21; emphasis added).  Among other reasons, we 
achieve a more complete understanding of the system by using different experimental methods 
because each methodology yields some information that is inaccessible to the others.8 
 
The analysis I have given here supports Diamond’s claim; moreover, the addition of a CPT 
analysis yields even more information than just laboratory experiments, field experiments, and 
natural experiments would have. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
I’ve argued that Binkley et al. (2006) make use of a CPT analysis in conjunction with natural 
experiments to settle questions of causality on the Kaibab plateau in the 1920s.  CPT has been 
typically deployed in the social sciences; this raises the question of how common CPTs are in 
ecology and other natural sciences.  Notable here is that Binkley et al. are examining a particular 
                                               
8 See also Currie (2015) on “methodological omnivory.” 
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historical case. 
 
Sharon Crasnow argues that “specific pieces of evidence produced through process tracing are 
useful as evidence for singular [“token”] causation” (2012, 665). Binkley et al.’s conclusions fit 
Crasnow’s general characterization; they make two token causal claims: 1) On the Kaibab 
Plateau in the 1920s, the loss of predators caused a deer irruption and 2) On the Kaibab Plateau 
in the 1920s, there was a deer irruption that depleted aspen. 
 
This suggests that the CPT approach (perhaps in concert with other types of experiment) may be 
particularly useful in the historical natural sciences (or natural sciences re-examining a particular 
historical case) as evidence for token causation, e.g., some parts of evolution, climate science, 
and paleontology (cf. Cleland 2001, 2002).  Further work might examine whether researchers in 
these areas are commonly deploying a CPT approach already9 or whether they might profit from 
doing so.  For example, using fossil data and other indicators of past environments to reconstruct 
past ecosystems and their trajectories through time (paleoecology) might be profitably 
understood in terms of CPT, although of course as one’s studies recede further into the distant 
past, certain types of sources (such as interviews and written materials) might no longer be 
available. 
 
Binkley et al. (2006) also suggest that their case in combination with other cases could be taken 
as evidence for the general phenomenon of trophic cascades; in other words, they believe that 
their case contributes to general (“type”) causation as well: 
                                               
9 See, for example, Wylie (2011) and Forber and Griffith (2011). 
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Our results combine with other case studies (for example, Gasaway and others 1992; 
Krebs and others 2003; Ripple and Beschta 2003, 2004) to indicate that top-down control 
of food webs is probably not unusual in terrestrial ecosystems (Binkley et al. 2006, 240). 
 
If this is right, then the CPT approach (again, perhaps in conjunction with other types of 
experiment) could ultimately contribute to type causation conclusion by combining examination 
of different cases.  To be clear, however, the inference to type causation would not itself be a 
direct product of experimentation or CPT; rather, the results analyzing particular cases, if 
deemed to have sufficiently similar causal patterns, could be generalized to infer type causation.  
In other words, the reasoning from the single case to the general case, and thus from token 
causation to type causation, would simply be inductive. 
 
Relatedly, CPT can be understood as revealing mechanisms.  Crasnow writes: 
 
The value of process tracing is thus thought to rest in how it provides evidence for causal 
mechanisms. Statistical and experimental methods may be able to establish a link between 
a dependent and independent variable, but they cannot reveal what is in the “black box” 
– the mechanisms through which the cause brings about the effect (Crasnow 2017: 7). 
Indeed, according to Crasnow, CPT is widely understood this way, with social scientists citing 
philosophers of science such as Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) and Glennan (2002).  But 
I think a bit of caution is in order here.  As Skipper and Millstein (2005) argue, the requirements 
for these accounts of mechanism are more stringent than they might appear on first blush, 
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requiring, for example, that the parts or entities of a mechanism be organized and structured.  In 
the same way that it is doubtful whether natural selection can meet these and other mechanism 
criteria (Skipper and Millstein 2005), it is doubtful whether trophic cascades (which can manifest 
in many different ways with many different types of entities and activities) can be fruitfully 
understood in terms of these philosophical accounts of mechanisms.  The same is true, I suspect, 
for other causal processes revealed by CPT, such as the case of the 2000 U.S. presidential 
election discussed above.  Nonetheless, the notion that CPT seeks to fill in black boxes between 
cause and effect (sometimes referred to “mechanism sketches” in the philosophical literature) 
seems apt, and there may be cases in which CPT does reveal causal processes that operate in a 
sufficiently organized and regular way such that it makes sense to see those causal processes as 
“mechanisms” in the sense espoused by the “new mechanists.”  (Of course, one might also 
simply be using the term “mechanism” in a looser sense).  In other cases, the causal processes 
revealed by CPT might be more appropriately described by process accounts such as that of 
Salmon (1984) or Dupré (2017). 
 
Crasnow (2017) also argues that narrative is a core part of CPT, with the construction of a 
narrative of a particular case contributing to knowledge production.  That is, Crasnow argues, the 
narrative makes causally salient elements of the case coherent. Crasnow’s characterization goes 
beyond the way that many social scientists have portrayed CPT merely in terms of inference and 
hypothesis testing.  In Crasnow’s example, “Schultz’s account of the Fashoda crisis incident 
goes on for twenty pages of text…[in which] he tells the story of the crisis in detail, focusing on 
events, actors, and circumstances of the case” (Crasnow 2017, 11).  However, Binkley et al. do 
not provide this level of detail.     Furthermore, although they have reconstructed a timeline (as 
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noted above, a key feature of causal process tracing), the full historical timeline is never actually 
presented sequentially (first A happens, then B happens, then B happens…).  Instead, their 
primary focus is on answering the question “Was Aldo Leopold Right about the Kaibab Deer 
Herd?” (the title of the essay) – in other words, was he right about the trophic cascade between 
wolves, deer, and foliage – to which their answer is “yes.”  This is primarily a question about 
whether a particular type of process was operating; this is reflected, for example, in a section that 
is organized by possible causal factors rather than by the order of events.  Thus, what Binkley et 
al. provide does not seem to fit Crasnow’s characterization of a narrative, which is not to deny 
that they are providing a narrative in some other, perhaps thinner sense.  Although the question 
of narrative is an interesting one, my emphasis here is on  the case of the Kaibab as an instance 
of causal process tracing due to the variety of types of data used and the piecing together of a 
historical timeline on the basis of that data.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
My aims in this paper have been both specific and general.  My specific aim was to illuminate a 
canonical case in community ecology and the controversy that has surrounded it. To that end, I 
argued that Binkley et al. (2006) use CPT in conjunction with an natural trajectory experiment 
and two natural snapshot experiments. Viewing their paper in this light makes clear how their 
analysis gives good support for the claim that Leopold may have been right about trophic 
cascade in the Kaibab in the 1920s, i.e., showing that there are good (albeit defeasible) reasons to 
think that a loss of predators (together with fire suppression) led to a deer irruption which 
decreased aspen recruitment.  This resurrects a canonical case of trophic cascade for ecology as 
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well as a central example for Leopold’s claims about the interdependence of species, claims that 
play an important role in environmental ethics (Millstein 2018).  
 
My general aim was to show the potential for CPT to add to our cause-finding practices outside 
of the social sciences.  Ecology seems like an unlikely place to find CPT, and yet in this case it 
was able to enhance the experimenters’ natural experiments by ruling out other potential causal 
factors that (given the structure of a natural experiment) could not be controlled for.  No form of 
experiment could have uncovered these causal factors, which occurred in the past and in some 
cases are present only in written records or human memory.  CPT resurrects the historical 
timeline, and in so doing provides evidence for the sequence of events present in trophic 
cascades. Philosophers should be attentive to the possibility for its use in the natural sciences and 
aware of the benefits it can bring, despite its drawbacks (its open-endedness and its potential 
absence of controls). 
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